State v. Wass Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 43844 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-5-2016
State v. Wass Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43844
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Wass Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43844" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6328.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6328
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NOS. 43844 & 43845 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) CANYON COUNTY NOS.  
v.     ) CR 2015-15219 & CR 2015-15271 
     ) 
SHAWN WILLIAM WASS,  ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
_________________________ ) 
________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER S. NYE 
District Judge 
________________________ 
 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN    KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Interim State Appellate Public Defender Deputy Attorney General 
State of Idaho     Criminal Law Division 
I.S.B. #6555      P.O. Box 83720 
       Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS    (208) 334-4534 
 Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #9525 
P.O. Box 2816 
Boise, ID 83701  
(208) 334-2712 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR      ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT   PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
 i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................1 
 Nature of the Case .....................................................................................1 
 
 Statement of Facts and 
 Course of Proceedings ...............................................................................1 
 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL .......................................................................6 
ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................7 
 
 The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wass’  
 Motion To Suppress .........................................................................................7 
 
A. Introduction .................................................................................................7 
 
B. Standard Of Review ...................................................................................7 
 
C. The Miranda Warnings Given By Deputy Drake Did Not  
  Effectively Advise Mr. Wass Of His Fifth Amendment  
  Privilege Against Self-Incrimination ............................................................8 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 11 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) .................................................................... 1, 8 
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) ............................................................... 8, 9, 10 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) ....................................................................... 8, 9 
State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560 (Ct. App. 2005) ............................................................. 7 
State v. Henson, 138 Idaho 791 (2003)........................................................................... 8 
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206 (2009) .......................................................................... 7 
United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2015) ....................................................... 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Shawn William Wass appeals from his conviction for felony possession of a 
controlled substance, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.  
He contends the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the 
statements he made to a police officer after he was initially questioned by the officer 
without being advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
He contends the officer’s Miranda warnings did not effectively advise him of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because the warnings were given just 
two minutes after his non-Mirandized statements, by the same officer, in the same 
location, and a reasonable person in his position would not have understood the 
warnings to convey a message that he retained a choice about answering the officer’s 
questions.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
At approximately 12:30 a.m. on August 9, 2015, Canyon County Sheriff’s Deputy 
Dan Drake was patrolling in a location where a public road dead-ends into a river, which 
is an area open during daylight hours only.  (10/22/15 Tr., p.5, L.21 – p.6, L.7.)  Deputy 
Drake observed a purple vehicle parked in the parking area.  (10/22/15 Tr., p.7, Ls.2-8.)  
There was a man standing behind the vehicle and a woman sitting in the passenger 
seat.  (10/22/15 Tr., p.7, Ls.2-8.)  Deputy Drake put on his spotlights and approached 
the man, who identified himself as Shawn Wass.  (10/22/15 Tr., p.7, L.16 – p.8, L.6.)  
Mr. Wass stated he had driven to the area and did not have a driver’s license.  
(10/22/15 Tr., p.7, L.15 – p.8, L.15; p.17, Ls.10-12.)  Deputy Drake smelled alcohol on 
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Mr. Wass’ breath and Mr. Wass admitted he had been drinking.  (10/22/15 Tr., p.9, 
Ls.4-6; p.25, Ls.24-25.)  Deputy Drake learned from dispatch that Mr. Wass’ license had 
been suspended and that there were two outstanding warrants for his arrest.  (10/22/15 
Tr., p.10, Ls.5-17.)  Deputy Drake asked Mr. Wass to empty his pockets and Mr. Wass 
did so, stating he had a wallet with identification, and had lied about not having 
identification earlier.  (10/22/15 Tr., p.10, L.18 – p.11, L.4.)  Deputy Drake asked 
Mr. Wass to perform a field sobriety test, which Mr. Wass did successfully.  (10/22/15 
Tr., p.11, Ls.5-11.)  Deputy Drake placed Mr. Wass under arrest pursuant to the 
outstanding warrants and walked him to his police car.  (10/22/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-14.)   
As Deputy Drake was walking Mr. Wass to his police car, he asked Mr. Wass if 
there was anything illegal in his vehicle and Mr. Wass answered, “Yes, there are 
syringes.”  (10/22/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.18-21.)  Deputy Drake realized he had made a 
mistake in questioning Mr. Wass without providing the Miranda warnings.  He was 
asked at the suppression hearing, “Now, right after [Mr. Wass] responds with that 
answer, what are you thinking to yourself?”  (10/22/15 Tr., p.11, L.25 – p.12, L.1.)  He 
answered, “I was thinking that I made a mistake and that I should stop asking 
questions.”  (10/22/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-8.)   
Deputy Drake then placed Mr. Wass in his police car, and “looked through the 
windows of the vehicle to see if there was anything illegal in plain view and there was 
not.”  (10/22/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.12-19.)  Approximately two minutes after Deputy Drake 
placed Mr. Wass in his police car, he returned to his police car, opened the door, and 
said, “Well, I need to read you your Miranda warning.”  (10/22/15 Tr., p.12, L.23 – p.13, 
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L.5.)  Deputy Drake then read Mr. Wass the following Miranda warnings from a card he 
had with him: 
You have the right to remain silent.  Anything you say may be used 
against you in a court of law.  You have the right to talk to a lawyer and 
have them present while you’re being questioned.  If you cannot afford to 
hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to you—appointed to represent you 
before questioning.  Do you understand these rights as I’ve explained 
them to you? 
 
(10/22/15 Tr., p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.5; p.15, L.19 – p.16, L.7.)  Mr. Wass stated he 
understood his rights.  (10/22/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.9-13.)  Deputy Drake asked Mr. Wass 
again whether there was anything illegal in his vehicle and Mr. Wass told Deputy Drake 
for a second time that there were syringes in the back.  (10/22/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.1-5.)  
Deputy Drake searched the vehicle and located syringes and an “aluminum foil bindle 
that contained a green leafy substance.”  (10/22/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.4-11; R., p.57.)    
Mr. Wass was charged by Information in CR-2015-15271 with felony possession 
of a controlled substance.  (R., pp.25, 29-30.)  He was charged in CR-2015-15219 with 
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance and misdemeanor possession of 
drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.12, 13.)  The two cases were consolidated in the district 
court.  (R., pp.22, 23.)   
Mr. Wass filed a motion to suppress.  (R., pp.42-51.)  The State filed a 
memorandum opposing Mr. Wass’ motion.  (R., pp.59-67.)  The district court held a 
hearing, at which Deputy Drake testified.  (R., pp.68-70.)  The district court denied 
Mr. Wass’ motion, and announced its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the 
record.  (10/22/15 Tr., p.27, Ls.11-12.)  The district court framed the issue as “whether 
the drug evidence must be suppressed . . . because of the first unwarned statements 
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about the syringes or . . . does the Miranda warnings given a few minutes later cure that 
problem.”1  (10/22/15 Tr., p.26, Ls.13-17.)  The district concluded: 
And I find that it does cure the problem and I’m going to deny the 
suppression.  I find that the officer did not tactically induce a confession 
prior to Miranda warnings—or coerce a confession or use improper tactics 
to obtain the confession prior to Miranda warnings.  And the second 
Miranda warnings do[ ] cure the failure to administer it the first time.  It’s 
not a coercion where the actual circumstances are [not] calculated to 
undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will. 
 
(10/22/15 Tr., p.26, L.18 – p.27, L.2.)  The district court further concluded that Mr. Wass’ 
post-Miranda statements about the syringes provided Deputy Drake with reasonable 
suspicion to search the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement.  (10/22/15 Tr., p.27, Ls.3-7.) 
Following the suppression hearing, the parties entered into a plea agreement 
pursuant to which Mr. Wass pled guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance 
and the State dismissed the misdemeanor charges and recommended a rider.  
(R., pp.75-76, 96-97; 10/27/15 Tr., p.3.)  Mr. Wass reserved his right to appeal from the 
denial of his motion to suppress.  (10/27/15 Tr., pp.3-4.)   
The district court accepted Mr. Wass’ guilty plea and sentenced him to a unified 
term of seven years, with three years fixed.  (10/27/15 Tr., p.9; 12/22/15 Tr., p.7; 
R., p.94.)  The district court suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Wass on probation 
for a period of five years.  (R., p.94.)  The judgment was entered on December 22, 
2015, and Mr. Wass filed a timely notice of appeal on December 23, 2015.  (R., pp.99-
                                            
1 At the suppression hearing, counsel for Mr. Wass also argued that the Miranda 
warnings given by Deputy Drake were insufficient as a matter of law because he did not 
advise Mr. Wass that he could stop answering questions at any time.  (10/22/15 
Tr., p.16, Ls.8-15; p.22, Ls.7-16.)    
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102, 104-05.)  The notice of appeal referenced both case numbers, CR-2015-15271 
and CR-2015-15219.  (R., p.104)  This Court issued an order on January 15, 2016, 
consolidating the two appeals.  (R., p.125).  Mr. Wass does not raise an issue with 
respect to CR-2015-15219, which was assigned Case No. 43844.  (R., pp.12, 95.)   
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wass’ motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wass’ Motion To Suppress 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The district court denied Mr. Wass’ motion to suppress because it concluded that 
even though Deputy Drake initially questioned Mr. Wass without advising him of his 
Miranda rights, the fact that Mr. Wass responded to the same questioning after being 
advised of his rights cured any error.  Mr. Wass contends the officer’s Miranda warnings 
did not effectively advise him of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent because the 
warnings were given just two minutes after his non-Mirandized statements, by the same 
officer, in the same location, and a reasonable person in his position would not have 
understood the warnings to convey a message that he retained a choice about 
answering the officer’s questions.    
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress 
evidence, the standard of review is bifurcated.”  State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 
(2009) (citation omitted).  “This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s 
application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
“At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve 
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial 
court.”  State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted). 
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C.  The Miranda Warnings Given By Deputy Drake Did Not Effectively Advise 
Mr. Wass Of His Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
 
In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that a person must 
be informed of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prior to custodial 
interrogation; otherwise, any incriminating statements made are inadmissible.  384 U.S. 
at 444-45; see State v. Henson, 138 Idaho 791, 795 (2003) (citation omitted) 
(discussing Miranda).  A person is in custody when he is subjected to a restraint on his 
liberty in any degree similar to a formal arrest.  Henson, 138 Idaho at 795 (citations 
omitted).  A person is interrogated whenever subjected to express questioning or its 
functional equivalent.  Id. (citation omitted). 
In the present case, it is undisputed that Mr. Wass was subjected to a custodial 
interrogation by Deputy Drake without being given his Miranda warnings.  Deputy Drake 
placed Mr. Wass under arrest pursuant to two outstanding warrants, then asked him 
whether there was anything illegal in his vehicle.  (10/22/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-14, 18-21.)  
Mr. Wass told Deputy Drake there were syringes in his vehicle.  (10/22/15 Tr., p.11, 
Ls.20-21.)  The question presented here is whether this obvious Miranda violation was 
“cured” when Deputy Drake advised Mr. Wass of his Miranda rights two minutes later, 
and asked Mr. Wass again whether there was anything illegal in his vehicle.  (10/22/15 
Tr., p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.5; p.14, Ls.1-5.)  The answer can be found by examining two 
cases from the United States Supreme Court, Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), 
and Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (plurality opinion).   
In Elstad, a burglary suspect made an initial incriminating statement in his home, 
without being advised of his Miranda rights, then later made a full confession at the 
police station, after receiving Miranda warnings and waiving his rights.  470 U.S. at 300-
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01.  The Elstad Court held the second statement was admissible and voluntary, noting 
“[i]t is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer 
the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated 
to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory 
process that a subsequent voluntary informed waiver is ineffective for some 
indeterminate period.”  Id. at 309.   
In Seibert, the United States Supreme Court addressed the two-step 
interrogation technique of giving Miranda warnings only after an interrogation has 
produced a confession, and then questioning the suspect so as to “cover the same 
ground a second time.”  542 U.S. at 604.  A plurality of the Court distinguished the case 
from Elstad, and concluded that “when Miranda warnings are inserted in the midst of 
coordinated and continuing interrogation, they are likely to mislead and deprive a 
defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and 
the consequences of abandoning them.”  Id. at 613-14 (quotation marks, alterations and 
citation omitted).  Under the multi-factor test set forth by the Seibert plurality, the 
admissibility of statements given after midstream Miranda warnings hinges on whether 
“a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes could have seen the [second round of] 
questioning as a new and distinct experience, [and whether] the Miranda warnings 
could have made sense as presenting a genuine choice whether to follow up on the 
earlier admission.”  Id. at 616.  The factors identified as relevant to this inquiry are “the 
completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, 
the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the 
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second [interrogations], the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the 
interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.”2  Id.  
Turning to the present case, a reasonable person in Mr. Wass’ position would not 
have seen Deputy Drake’s second round of questioning as a separate and distinct 
experience from the first, and would not have believed he had a genuine choice 
regarding whether to remain silent.  Mr. Wass’ second statement was the same as the 
first, and was given in the same location, within a matter of minutes, to the same police 
officer.  He surely perceived the questioning as continuous.  Upon hearing the standard 
Miranda warnings given by Deputy Drake, Mr. Wass would hardly think he had a 
genuine right to remain silent, let alone persist in so believing once Deputy Drake asked 
him the very same question he had asked before.  See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613.  It is 
more likely that Mr. Wass was perplexed about the reason for discussing rights when 
Deputy Drake did not expressly inform him that the statement he had previously given—
a mere two minutes earlier—could not be used against him.  See id.   
The Miranda warnings given to Mr. Wass by Deputy Drake, inserted in the midst 
of what was effectively a single interrogation, did not effectively advise Mr. Wass of his 
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.  Deputy Drake testified at the suppression 
hearing that the syringes were not located in plain view in Mr. Wass’ vehicle.  (10/22/15 
Tr., p.12, Ls.12-19.)  Absent Mr. Wass’ first pre-Miranda statement, and his second, 
                                            
2 Following Seibert, a circuit split has developed regarding whether all two-step 
interrogations are eligible for a Seibert inquiry (per the plurality opinion), or whether the 
inquiry only applies to those cases involving deliberate use of the two-step procedure 
(per Justice Kennedy’s concurrence).  See United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 272-73 
(6th Cir. 2015) (discussing circuit split, adopting multi-factor test announced by the 
plurality and rejecting Justice Kennedy’s subjective intent-based test).  Idaho has not 
yet decided this issue. 
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post-ineffective Miranda statement, Deputy Drake lacked reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause for a drug investigation.  Both of Mr. Wass’ statements should have 
been suppressed under Miranda and Siebert. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Wass respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the 
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district 
court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 5th day of July, 2016. 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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